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In the middle of the nineties, the sharp increase in globalisation and the last privatization 
wave have promoted the shaping of a market for executives in France. Characteristics of this 
market are estimated for France and a competitive model is simulated in order to assess to 
what extend such a model could explain the observed CEO compensations. The size elasticity 
of compensation in France is equal to 0.5 and justifies a large magnitude in compensation. To 
moderate those compensations, a wage cap is often called for by opinion and the European 
left but also, more surprisingly, by representative of shareholders. The cost of this policy is 
evaluated in this sorting model and the lobbying of shareholders is explained. 
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The French public has recently focussed its interest on executive pay for two
main reasons. The ﬁrst is the disclosure of CEO and other executive compen-
sations imposed by the Law of 15 May 2001. The second is the double-digit
growth of CEO compensations compared to the 0.7% growth rate by year of
mean earning during the last decade. Generally, the rapid rise of french CEO
compensations has been interpreted as catching-up with Anglo-saxon’s, and
more particularly with american CEO compensations. The catching-up expla-
nation assumes an international market, with international opportunities given
to French executives. However, as real mobility is limited, French CEO com-
pensation should be linked to the evolution of the French market rather than an
international catching-up. Since the second privatisation wave (1993-1997), the
number of large publicly-traded ﬁrms has increase and the mean CEO compen-
sation for companies listed on the SBF120 index,is about ǫ3,000,000 in 2006.
This article tests, in a ﬁrst part, the hypothesis of market-driven compensation
∗Paris school of economics and University of Paris 1 , CES (ex-EUREQua) 106-112 bld de
l’Hˆ opital 75647 Paris Cedex 13; Email: Fabienne.Llense@univ-paris1.fr
1for French CEO following from this shaping of a competitive market.
A competitive equilibrium model, linked to job assignment and superstar
theory, is developed, in order to assess how much of the french CEO compen-
sations explosion can be explained in a competitive framework. The superstar
theory analyses the rise in stars’ compensations in a competitive process. The
rise is explained by the imperfect substitution between stars’ talents on the oﬀer
side and the extension of the market by technology on the demand side (Rosen
1981 [12]). As the talent appears relevant to analysing very high earnings, this
raises the question of the existence and characteristics of CEO talent. The tal-
ent existence has been underscored by the signiﬁcant CEO ﬁxed eﬀects on the
perfrmance of large US ﬁrms (Schoar and Bertrand 2003 [1]). The ﬁxed eﬀects
refer to diﬀerent management styles linked to CEO characteristics (MBA de-
gree, cohort). Nevertheless, the regression of compensation on observable CEO
attributes, such as age or formal qualiﬁcation, are non-signiﬁcant, meaning that
CEO compensations could not be estimated using a Mincer wage equation. As
the observable characteristics are not suﬃcient to speciﬁy talent heterogeneity,
the CEO talents could be modelized by a general tail distribution based on the
extrem values theory (Gabaix and Landier 2007 [4]). In a context in which the
compensation distribution diﬀers from the expected talent distribution, the job
assignment theory by introducing job characteristics could explain CEO com-
pensation distribution (Sattinger 1993 [8]). By matching heterogenous CEOs to
heterogenous jobs, wages play an allocative role in assigning talent to ﬁrm sizes.
The shape of the allocation and the intensity of skew depend on the complemen-
tarity between inputs. The assumption of complementarity implies that output
sensitivity to talent increases with ﬁrm size, leading to an allocation between
the most talented CEO and the largest ﬁrm, called a positive assortative match-
ing (Becker 1973 [5]). Firm sizes, CEO talents and the shape of the matching
function are key factors in wage determination, in a competitive market (Tervio
2003 [9]).
In line with the competitive Gabaix and Landier paper, a reference frame-
work is built here to analyse CEO wage distribution on french CEO market. A
2diﬀerential rents model, deﬁned as a job assignment model in which the variable
distributions are continuous, is developed in order to express wages as a function
of size and talent distribution parameters, and of the ﬁrm size itself. The wage
function is decomposed to better understand the size eﬀect and its interaction
with talent through the positive assortative matching. Whereas CEO compen-
sations and ﬁrm sizes are observable, CEO talent is diﬃcult to measure. The
theoretical relationship, through the diﬀerential rents model, between compen-
sations and sizes leads to estimate the underlying talent distribution needed to
generate the French CEO compensation levels The results suggest that to gen-
erate the french CEOs compensations, in a competitive framework, the talent
distribution has to be spread and concentrated in higher talents, i.e the market-
perception of diﬀerences between CEO is less homogeneous than for US.
The estimated parameters of the talent distribution are introduced to simu-
late the theoretical CEO compensation function in the competitive framework
previously build for the French economy. By simulating French compensations
in diﬀerent scenario, the potential evolution of the size elasticity of wages, and
the level reached at equilibrium are found and compare with empirical data.
Interestingly, the simulations lead to both elasticity and the shape of the sur-
plus share evaluations, which extend the normative interest of this analysis. It
includes the opportunity of both better understanding the fundamental rela-
tionship between wage and size through the evolution of distribution parame-
ters such as the talent and size concentration, as well as another opportunity
to examine the french case. The 0.5 empirical size elasticity of compensation in
France is reproduced in the simulations. The elasticity analysis indicates that
the model may provide a general framework to understand the speciﬁcity and
the non linear relationship between the size elasticity of CEO compensations
and parameters of the size and talent distribution. This framework helps to
summarize results concerning the eﬀects of the distribution of non invariant
factor on compensations structure. The simulated compensation function in
a competitive framework explains a large share of the observed compensation
levels, but seems unable to explain the existence of groups of compensation be-
3yond 8 million euro for middle cap ﬁrms and some other compensations under
the predicted competitive compensation for the smallest ﬁrms. Some others
investigations must be done to insulate the imperfection on this speciﬁc market.
There is undoubtedly a gap between actual CEO pay and what people re-
gard as fair compensations. This observation leads the European politicians
to address the subject considering the feasibility of a ceiling for the highest
compensations and suggesting a moderate ratio between the workers (blue and
white collars) and the chief executive oﬃcer, as Angela Merkel position testify.
This paper introduces a cap policy in the framework of a sorting model in order
to assess the eﬀect of such a regulatory limitation on the shareholder wealth, the
CEO earnings and the production. The main concern about the use of a limita-
tion is: how attract the right CEO for the right job? Indeed, the introduction
of a cap policy neutralizes the allocative role of the compensation leading to a
costly mismatch. Simulations of the model for diﬀerent upper limits are able to
explain why some consulting ﬁrms and shareholder association call for a wage
cap.
2 The job assignment framework
On this market, there are two sources of heterogeneity: the ability of the CEO
and the size of the ﬁrm. Given this heterogeneity which is perfectly observable,
shareholders choose the best CEO to manage their ﬁrm. This matching issue is
resolved in two steps.
In a ﬁrst step, the equilibrium allocation function is speciﬁed, then, in a sec-
ond step, the system of prices (CEO compensations) that sustains this matching
is found. Let t ∈ [t0,tmax]denote the ex ante market-perception (Board of direc-
tors) of the CEO talent and s ∈ [s0,smax] denote the ﬁrm size (market value),
both are unidimentional. Individuals and ﬁrms are considered as a unit mass
such that at the equilibrium there is full employement. The distributions of
those inputs are continuous and characterized by CDF denoted, F(t) for talent
distribution and G(s) for size distribution with j = F(t) the talent quantile of
4CEO and i = G(s) the size quantile of ﬁrm into the distribution. The quantity
of work provides by a CEO could not be increased neither in an intensive mar-
gin (through eﬀort or time) nor in an extensive one (through hiring). All the
CEOs provide the same eﬀort, the only sorting characteristic is the ability and
consequently there is no moral hazard issue. Hence, a ﬁxed amount of capital is
allocated with a ﬁxed amount of ability. This indivisibility is taken into account
in job assignment model and implies that the marginal productivity of factors is
a separate concept relative to the classical one. The production function Y(.) is




This expression (1) describes the Scale-of-Operation eﬀect that consists on allo-
cating the largest ressources to the best manager given that the marginal impact
of CEO talent is assumed to increase with the value of assets under his control.
This assumption is built on the complementarity between ﬁrm size and CEO
ability. The elasticity of substitution is weak in order to represent the rigid
repartition due to indivisibility of factors of production. In this model, ﬁrms
sizes are independant from the CEO ability. However, the size of the assets
managed by CEO have been increased through the NICT developpement (Ac-
quistions and mergers are easier thanks to the increasing volume of informations
and transactions which could be executed), which enhanced the complementar-
ity between the two inputs and enable CEO to manage more and more larger
ﬁrms.
Deﬁnition 1 The competitive equilibrium consists in: (i) a matching function
M(.) which allocates a ﬁrm from the i-quantile to a CEO from the j-quantile
such that j=M(i), i,j ∈ [0,1]; and (ii) a wage function w(j), which veriﬁes the
two following conditions: (a) each ﬁrm selects the j:th CEO which maximize the
shareholder value π(j,i)st:
Maxj Y (t(j),s(i)) − w(j) (2)
5and (b) both the participation constraint of the CEO (w0) and of the owners
(π0), i.e the reserve prices are fulﬁlled:
w(j) > w0 ∀j ∈ [0,1] (3)
π(j,i) = Y (t(j),s(i)) − w(j) > π0 ∀i,j ∈ [0,1] (4)
The CEO utility of reservation is w0 and the shareholders utility of reservation
is π0.
The ﬁrst order condition is obtained. The slope of the proﬁle equals the
product of the partial derivative of output with respect to productive ability, i.e
the job sensitivity to ability and the ability spacing at this level:
w′(j) = t′(j)Y1(t(j),s(i)) (5)
At the equilibrium, each ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁt (2) by ﬁlling up the condition




0, the largest is the ﬁrm, the highest is the ability return. Consequently, each
CEO has preference for working in the largest ﬁrm. By the same way, because
of the complementarity between the input, talent and assets, a biggest ﬁrm is
more sensible to ability than a smaller one and so wishes to hire the most able
CEO. At the equilibrium, highest ability CEO t(1) is placed in the largest ﬁrms
s(1) chooses the best CEO, and the second ﬁrm mates the second best and so
forth. The equilibrium match is a positive assortative matching with M(.), the
identity function. The ﬁrst order condition (5) becomes:
w′(i) = t′(i)Y1(t(i),s(i)) ∀iǫ[0,1] (6)
By integrating (6) and according to the participation constraint the wage
6structure1 is the following:




The absolut wage levels are determined by the reserve price w0 and the diﬀeren-
tial rents themselves determined by the localisation of the ﬁrm-CEO pair into the
distribution. The prices of inputs exhaust the product: Y (i,i) = π(i)+w(i),∀i.
Thus, the free entry condition depends on the link between reservation prices
and the match formed by the last CEO and the smallest ﬁrm: Y (t(0),s(0)) =
π0 + w0. Hence, at the equilibrium, the last ﬁrm’s proﬁt is driven down by
opportunity costs in equilibrium.
Limits cases There will be no diﬀerential rents and no assignment issue if
all the CEOs have the same talent. The CEOs will be paid exactly the same
total pay whatever the ﬁrm size. This compensation would be exactly equal to
their common reservation wage w0, given that there is no extra costs to manage
a larger corporation (Bertrand competition). Similarly, if all the ﬁrms have the
same size, CEO earned exactly their joint production and the wage distribution
would be like the talent distribution.
Following Tervio (2005), a new matching function ϕ(.) is used to express
wages as a function of the ﬁrms size only:
t = ϕ(s) s.t F(t) = G(s) (8)
The wage function is written:




with ϕ′(s) the matching function slope: ϕ′(s) =
G
′(s)
F ′(ϕ(s)) > 0
This latter equation is the ratio of the potential demand for talent for the








7a kind of tension index on the CEO market for each ﬁrm size. This matching
function is increasing and concave in s:
w′(s) = ϕ′(s)Y1(ϕ(s),s)
w′′(s) = ϕ′′(s)Y1(ϕ(s),s) + ϕ′(s)[Y1,1(ϕ(s),s) + ϕ′(s)Y2,0(ϕ(s),s)]
WithY2,0(ϕ(s),s) 6 0 and Y1,1(ϕ(s),s) > 0 due to the complementarity. The
wage equation is concave if ϕ′′(s)Y1(ϕ(s),s) + ϕ′(s)Y1,1(ϕ(s),s) < 0, when
ϕ(.) is suﬃciently concave function:ϕ′′(s) < 0 , i.e the sizes are more inequaly
distributed than CEO ability.
The compensation increases according to the complementarity of input (1),
through both the positive assortative matching and the tension on this portion
of the market. At the equilibrium, the wage is an increasing function in the
reservation salary, the ﬁrm size and the demand, both the number of ﬁrm and
the density and a decreasing function in the oﬀer (potential substitution).
3 Comparative Statics and diﬀerential rents
3.1 The distribution choice
Firm size cumulative distribution function
In order to represent the distribution of large publicly-traded ﬁrms, a Pareto
distribution G(.) is selected; this assumption is very usual, see Takayasu and
Okuyama (1998 [6]), Axtell (2006 [11]), Gabaix and Landier (2007). This distri-
bution is deﬁned by the tail index (shape parameter) α and the scale parameter






This function is increasing in s and α and decreasing in s0. Moreover the size
is inversely proportionnal to its rank such that: S(n) = An
− 1










the rank n ∈ [0,K] corresponds to the
i-quantile s and K is the rank of the least able. The quantile-rank relation is












8Ability cumulative distribution function
Using Gabaix and Landier (2007) talent distribution, talents’ spacings could
be described by a very general relation: t′(i) = BL(1 − i)(1 − i)β−1with
L(.) a slowing variable function, β the tail index of the distribution of talents
and B the scale parameter. Talents are assumed to be bounded consequently
L(.) is a constant and the shape parameter is positive β > 0. The cumulative
distribution function is written:
F(t) = 1 − C(tmax − t)
1
β, t < tmax < ∞ (10)
Gabaix and Landier write the talent according to the rank n ∈ [0,K]: T(n) =
−B
β (nβ − Kβ)with K the rank of the least able. The talent of the more able is
written: tmax = t(1) = T(0) = B
β Kβ. From the relationship between rank and
quantile previously mentioned: n = K(1 − i),∀i ∈ [0,1] and n ∈ [0,K]. So I





(K − Ki)β − Kβ] (11)
We choose the cumulative distribution function F(.) so that i = F(t):
F(t) = 1 − C (tmax − t)
1
β (12)






and L = Kβ. So,F(.) is constructed such that the talent
distribution is a power law with ﬁnite support.
The wage function





chosen distribution, the wage function could be rewritten as an explicit function
of all the parameters and the ﬁrm size:











The wage is always increasing in the size of the ﬁrm, but concave. Gabaix and
Landier have highlighted the impact of the median size, which is a synthese of
the size distribution parameters, without taking into account the role plays by
the ﬁrm localisation (quantile) into the distribution. On the contrary, Tervio
9(2007) does but without a tractable talent distribution. In the two following
parts, the impact of the size on the CEO wage is divided into a direct and
indirect size eﬀect through the study of the sensitivity of wages to size according
to the distribution parameters and the localisation of the ﬁrm.
3.2 The eﬀects of size and talent distribution on the wage-
size relationship
The sensitivity of wages to the ﬁrm size is enhanced or decreased according
to the location of the ﬁrm in the distribution. This variation depends on the
inequality parameters of the distributions. These shape parameters lead the
diﬀerential rents.The impact of the size distribution on the wage sensitivity to














The sign of the partial derivative is positive when the size of the ﬁrm is under
the threshold c sα, and negative otherwise, with:




This size corresponds to a rank c nα from which the slope of the wage function
is diminishing with ﬁrm size. Whatever the variation of the Pareto tail index,
the rank c nα is invariant with α as long as there is no entry.





so ∂ c nα






If GA and GB are two cumulative distribution functions of size, with the
same scale parameter s0. GA dominates GB by ﬁrst order stochastic dominance
if: GA(s) ≤ GB(s). Meaning that, for all s, there is at least one sk such that
GA(sk) < GB(sk). On this case the relationship between the parameters is:
αA < αB. A change from B to A distribution, due to globalisation for instance,
raises sizes at all quantiles except for the smallest one. The new market is
composed by more bigger ﬁrms and less smaller ones. Indeed, a decrease in
α leads to more biggest ﬁrms in the economy, c sα increases but the rank of
10this threshold ﬁrm stays the same, c nα. When α decreases, the more inequal
size distribution implies a decrease in the wage sensitivity for ﬁrms under the
threshold and an increase for ﬁrms above the threshold. The direct eﬀect of
the decrease of α results in a less sloping wage for the size below the threshold
and a higher slope for the ﬁrms above the threshold. There could be second
eﬀect through the matching technology. Indeed, similarly,the wage sensitivity












The sign of the partial derivative is positive when the size of the ﬁrm is under
the threshold c sβ, and negative otherwise, with:
c sβ = s0K
1
α (16)
The rank of c sβ is written: ˆ nβ = 1. For a given β, when α decreases, the indirect
eﬀect lowers the positive size eﬀect only for the highest quantile. To sum up, a
decrease of α implies a less concave function (lower wage growth, i.e lower wage
slope) for the ﬁrms below ˆ nα and higher wage growth for the ﬁrms above this
threshold. The sensitivity of the largest ﬁrms has been reenforced, and so the
resulting wage function is extended and the expected wages inequality is higher.
CEO compensations are more spread, more inequaly distributed. Moreover,
the more the wage is sensitive to the size the more the surplus is shared in
favour of the CEO. As a result, the size elasticity of wage and the mean size
elasticity of wages (more sensitivity for larger ﬁrms) are higher. At the same
time, for a given size, the CEO compensation could be inferior to the previous
compensation because this ﬁrm size corresponds, in the new conﬁguration, to a
lower quantile. Consequently, after a globalization process, CEO compensation
levels are both higher and more inequaly distributed.2
2Median size (s02
1
α ) versus threshold c sα: the two sizes are only equal for a speciﬁc value of
β = 1.44. If β > 1 and 1
β > ln(2) or if β < 1 then c sα > smedian, otherwise c sα < smedian. In a
sectional analysis this threshold is more consistant to understand the non linear relationship
between size and compensation.
11The same exercice is done for an increase in CEO talents: FC and FD two
cumulative distribution function of talent, with the same scale parameter B. If
FCdominates FD by ﬁrst order stochastic dominance, then βD < βC. In the ”C”
case, CEO are more inequaly distributed and more talented in average. The tail
index β could be interpreted as the result of a screening process which, according
to its properties (education, competition, exam), or according to the employers
expectations (increasing and precise informations on the ability and career of
each CEO, networks, role of the leader in the economic context) induces inequal
degree of talent distribution. The bounds (upper and lower) of the distribution
are invariant in order to determine the eﬀects of talent improvement on a given
scale of talents (when β increases B is lower). If β increases, the CEO ability
is regarded as better for each quantile except the ﬁrst and the last ones. This
increase in β implies a higher sensibility of CEO compensation for ﬁrms under
the threshold ˆ nβ. Indeed, at theirs quantiles the competition is lower. At the
contrary, the potential substitution intensity raises for the others quantiles. The
intensity of the sensibility increase or decrease with β but the number of ﬁrms of
each sensibility stays equal. For the lowest quantiles there is more productivity
and less substitution leading to an increase of their wage sensitivity and through
the wage slope at their quantile. The slope of the wage function will be higher for
the ﬁrst quantiles (under the β threshold) and lower after. At the same time B
(the space between CEO characteristics) decreases, the potential substitution is
slightly increased at all quantiles and CEO diﬀerential rents would be lower. The
increase in β has also a second eﬀect through the positive assortative matching,
the c nα increases leading to an increase in the number of ﬁrms with lower wage
sensitivity to size. In further section, simulations illustrate those comparative
statics, and permit to discuss the value of the median size elasticity of wages.
Without shifts in the distributions (time-invariant), a change in the tech-
nology of production through uniform productivity growth (NICT) could be
modelized. This uniform productivity growth reinforces the complementarity
between talent and size. Two evolutions are feasible. Relative to the uniform
shift in technology, the outside opportunites could change in lockstep such that
12they drive down the ﬁrm’s proﬁt, there is no entry. There are no change in the
potential substitution and competition among ﬁrms, the same surplus share is
kept and the wage slope is exactly the same but the increasing complementarity
increases automatically the mean elasticity and so the wages. On the contrary,
if reserve prices stay at the same level, new smaller ﬁrms could enter on the
market by covering the reservation prices. The entrant ﬁrms have smaller size
decreasing the wage distribution but the number of ﬁrms increases thanks to
the activation of new ﬁrms increasing the wage distribution.
To test the explanatory power of this model, the parameters need to be
estimated for France in order to carry out some simulations.
4 French data and parameterization
The previous model has allowed us to understand how market forces, through
distribution of complement heterogenous inputs, drive the wage structure. Most
of the components of the theoretical wage could be observed or calculated: the
sizes of ﬁrms, the Pareto tail index, the real wages structure and the number
of ﬁrms. Only the talent distribution parameters β and B are unknown. An
estimation of the french underlying talent distribution characterised by those
parameters is performed. These estimates are obtained by a Generalised Method
of Moments (GMM) estimation in order to minimize the digression between the
observed and the predicted compensations described by the equation (13) which
is non linear, without speciﬁcation on earning distribution.
The data come from Proxinvest, a french independant consulting ﬁrm. Their
data are only collected from corporate reports. For the purpose of this study, the
largest sample available, the french index SBF120 is used. This index includes
the 120 largest French publicly-traded ﬁrms, large-cap and mid-cap represent-
ing more than 75% of the total market capitalization of french listed companies.
This study exploits the 2002-2005 data. The size of the sample, which prevents
to use panel methodology, is the result of the french legislation which has re-
quired the disclosure of these information since 2001 and with more details since
132005 only. Two series of data are used: CEO compensations and the ﬁrm sizes.
All the data are in real terms, using the current compensations and the ﬁrm
sizes deﬂated by the 2005 retail price index.3 The compensations are compiled
with salary, bonus and the option values (using the Black and Scholes formula
which is an ex ante assess), but ignoring deferred compensations and beneﬁts.
The year compensation is reconstructed by using salary, bonus, options and oth-
ers compensations awarded for a speciﬁc year after their publication in the next
year corporation reports. These compensations are calculated for the number
one, i.e the better paid chief executive oﬃcer, denoted in french: “Pr´ esident
directeur g´ en´ eral”, “Directeur g´ en´ eral”, “Pr´ esident du directoire”, “Directeur
g´ en´ eral”, “Pr´ esident” or “G´ erant”. The only CEO dropped from the sample is
Sir Lindsay Owen Jones due to the speciﬁcity of his outside opportunities which
lead to regard him as a Anglo-saxon or American CEO.
Firm size has many measures in the literature: the number of employees,
the turnover, the sales, or the market capitalization. The choice of the measure
depends on the way CEO interact with ﬁrm assets. Consequently, the number
of employees is not an appropriate measure even if it is the INSEE4 criterion to
deﬁne ﬁrm size. According to the fundings of Bertrand and Schoar, CEO has
very general actions and mostly in ﬁnancial and strategic domains. Moreover,
as emphasized by Baker and Hall, the marginal productivity of CEO talent or
eﬀort is relative to the real role play by these managers. The CEO links the
ﬁrm to their shareholders and creditors through the implementation of strategic
decisions (acquistion, dividend policy...). Thus, using the turnover does not take
into account the ﬁrm potential and also the long term eﬀect of CEO actions.
Therefore, the more consistant size variable seems to be the market capitaliza-
tion. Moreover, the capitalization (with the turnover) is the variable with the
strongest correlation with CEOs compensations in the data, about 0.4. The
market capitalization is deﬁned as the share price at the 31 december multi-
plied by the number of shares outstanding. The data are available for diﬀerent
3Statistical source INSEE.
4The National Institute for statistics and Economic Studies.
14numbers of ﬁrms depending on the year. Respectively for 2003, 2004 and 2005
there are 64, 93 and 52 ﬁrms.
Technology and matching The most simpliest increasing positive-value func-
tion is choosen: Y (t,s) = (1+t)s. In the data, the positive assortative matching
is tested by the spearman coeﬃcient. This coeﬃcient indicates the correlation
between the rank of the compensation and the rank of the ﬁrm size. The Spear-
man coeﬃcient is around 0.68 for the year 2004.
The distribution of ﬁrm size parameters: The size distribution kernel density
is similar to a Pareto distribution. So, the Pareto index is estimated on the data
by maximum likelihood estimator. Estimations equal to 0.3 for 2003, 0.38 for
2004 and 0.37 for 2005. The diﬀerences between years could came either from
ﬂuctuations of the number of ﬁrm available in the index or from changes in the
size distribution. The scale parameter of the Pareto distribution is the minimum
size of the ﬁrm on this market.
The talent distribution parameters: The shape and space parameters β and
B are estimated for the french CEO market. The spacing between ability for
very high educated individuals is expected to be small according to Gabaix
and Landier. The shape parameter is more likely conditional on the screening
process which is, as we know diﬀerent between France and US,all the more
in the postgraduate education. Those parameters are expected to induce a
concentrated distribution due to the common background (Grandes Ecoles as X
or ENA) of almost all the CEOs of Large-cap and Mid-cap. A GMM estimation
is performed on equation (13). The results for the years 2003, 2004 and 2005
are summarized in Table 1. The estimates obtained for the three years are
very close. The talent distribution represents a subjective assess (for the Board
Councils) of the diﬀerences between the french CEO. The french underlying
ability distribution seems more unequal and less concentrated than the US one,
estimated by Gabaix and Landier. For the year 2004, the estimation of β is
about 2.6 and the estimation of B about 0.12 10−6. The market perception
of the diﬀerences between CEO, the distribution of talents,which is needed to
generate the french CEO earning structure, in a competitive market, is very
15Parameters 2003 2004 2005
K 63 92 52
β 2.64* 2.59* 2.38*
0.36 0.13 0.44
B 0.22** 0.12* 0.52
0.20 0.03 1.26
Note: std err; * signiﬁcant at 5% ** 10%
Table 1: GMM estimates of the talent distribution parameters
spread and concentrated in higher talents. Those estimated parameters could be
interpreted as an overestimation of the variety of french CEO abilities compared
to US one, and the result of the french elitism which leads to CEO with very
similar background. This dispersion could also be interpreted as the reﬂect of
better information on the talent of the manager due, by instance, to the strong
networks (corporatism) at stake on this french market.
Nevertheless, the two distributions, size and talent, are not independent.
This issue is mentioned by Rosen [13] who highlights the diﬃculties to separate
the size eﬀect from the performance one through the joint output. As perfor-
mance itself does not play any role in this model, there is no eﬀort cost and
so no incentives. The CEO is paid for his ex ante talent relative to his com-
petitors. For this purpose, in the estimation, the market capitalisation for the
previous year is used in order to instrument size. As analysed by Mullainathan
and Bertrand, the CEO could be rewarded for luck. In this model, this luck is
immediately included into ﬁrm size through increasing assets. As a result, the
marginal productivity of CEO increases with the output sensitivity to talent.
So, in this model, macroeconomic events enter directly in the compensation.
It could be seen as a sort of eﬃciency wage, which reinforces the pro-cyclical
properties of the CEO compensation. In the next section, the french wage dis-
tribution is simulated in order to discuss the normative interest of this model.
165 Simulations and discussion
Superstar eﬀect: the demand side
The model is simulated for the 2004 data which are the numerous. The
sample contains 92 of the largest publicly-traded ﬁrms, the smaller size (s0)is
2.07108, the minimal compensation ǫ208989.5, B = 0.1210−6 and β = 2.6.
The simulated CEO compensations reproduces well the main moments of the
compensation distribution as shown by the following Figure 2:

































Figure 1: Comparison between empirical and simulated compensations (France
2004)
Such simulations illustrate the wage structure in France, but also provide op-
portunity to investigate the predicted share that CEO acquires (in a competitive
framework) which is decreasing with ﬁrm size, from 0.25% to 0.01% bracket. As
expected, the surplus share is all the more in favour of CEO of smaller ﬁrms
when the ﬁrms concentration is higher. The CEO’s share depends on tension
on the market at his quantile. This illustrates the stylised fact under which
17CEO of the largest corporations deal with a smaller part of their marginal pro-
ductivity, which is nevertheless enhances by the size of the ﬁrm. The predicted
size elasticity of compensation is around 0.5065 for the french parametrization,
which is equal to the OLS estimation, on french data, in 2004. The simulations
with french parameterization show that a competitive framework is able to
reproduce the size elasticity of CEO compensations. A simulation of the US
market could be done5 in order to evaluate the superstar eﬀect on size elasticity
of compensations given the french talent distribution. The superstar eﬀect is
directly observable on Figure 2. For the French industrial base, the French
median elasticity is about 0.5 and should be equal to 0.8 if French CEO were
matched with the US distribution of ﬁrms. The elasticity of compensations will
be equal to 0.8. The size elaticity of compensations is non-linear with the tal-
ent distribution parameter (beta) and varies widely between diﬀerent ﬁnancial
market.









Figure 2: Comparison of the simulated median size elasticity of CEO compen-
sations in a US economy (dash) and in french economy (full)
Recent econometrical studies (Frydman 2005 [2], Frydman and Saks 2007
[3] and Kostiuk 1990), concerning elasticity, reveal a smallest estimation than
5Estimation of β and B of Gabaix and Landier performed through a panel approach but
the US median size elasticity of wage simulated with this model is about 1 which is equal to
the elasticity found by the authors.
18those predicted by this familly of models.6 Two explanations are hypothetized.
First, lower competition and substitution eﬀects due to more ﬁrm-speciﬁc skill
during far-distant periods. Frydman and Saks already found larger elasticity for
more recent periods. Second, a diﬀerent technological production characterized
by a lower CEO impact on global productivity due to a lower complementarity
with assets before the NICT revolution. The simulations of size elasticity of
CEO compensations according to variable distribution (free beta or alpha) have
an explanatory power, both in the sense of the increase in subsitution between
CEO through very weak or very high beta and lower value of alpha. The me-
dian size elasticity of compensations is non linear with respect to β and α. Does
this variability come from changes in size or in talent distribution functions as
suggested in this model? Since the talent is very diﬃcult to measure, the ﬁrms
anticipation concerning relative talents could explain such diﬀerences, like the
previous simulations illustrate it. Moreover, the recent shaping of a CEO market
in France, due to the latest privatizations could explain the lower levels of com-
pensations in the previous decades as the result of a weaker competition. Does
the shift correspond to a shift of French ﬁrms attitude towards their CEO: from
a monopsony to a more competitive situation? Economists highlighted the shift
in skill requirements, regarded as less ﬁrm-speciﬁc for manager (Frydman). In
France, CEO of larger ﬁrms have very homogeneous background of civil servant
or Grandes Ecoles diploma and as a consequence have outside opportunities in
high responsability public jobs. Hence, CEO of largest ﬁrms are completely
diﬀerent from the CEO of middle and small ﬁrms, indeed their training is very
generalist since a long time ago. Nevertheless, their participation to the CEO
market has been reinforced since the last privatisation (1993-1997) wave and
the introduction of previous public society on the stock exchange.
Superstar eﬀect : the oﬀer side A shift in talent oﬀer is simulated by increas-
ing the talent distribution inequality through First Order Stochastic Dominance.
The wage distribution is less scattering as the talent inequality soars the CEO
6Frydman and Saks estimated a 0.1 elasticity from 1936 to the beginning of the twenty-one
century.
19compensations of ﬁrst quantiles and decreases them in higher ones. The diﬀeren-
tial rents are linked to talent distribution but through a non linear relationship.
For a given size, shifts in market perception of diﬀerences between CEO could
decrease or increase the CEO compensation according to the diﬀerential rents.
The Uniform productivity growth: with and without free entry A uniform pro-
ductivity growth increases compensation with the same factor if the reservation
prices move in lockstep with the productivity, otherwise there is free entry and
the compensations increase a little more. The two cases imply very close com-
pensations structure and median size elasticity of compensation but a higher
mean elasticity of compensation for the free entry market. The period of new
economy can be modelized as an increase in the talent composition through a
higher β and a more liquid ﬁnancial market allowing an increase in α and a
uniform productivity growth which leads to an increasing number of ﬁrms and
CEO on the market resulting in higher compensations on the French market.
To illustrate the French actual superstar eﬀect, the loss due to the substitution
of the best CEO by the median one in the largest ﬁrm is around 0.095% to
compare to the 0.016% of Gabaix and Landier. The corresponding diﬀerential
compensation for CEO is equal to 226%, in this competitive framework with
a size elasticity about 0.5. Jasso, Meyerson and Milgrom (2003) worked on
macrojustice, through a MBA student survey, and evaluated that the median
elasticity of fair CEO compensation with respect to ﬁrm size should be in the
range of 0.14 to 0.26. In this competitive framework very few diﬀerences be-
tween prospective executives justify large magnitudes of compensation whereas
precisely, the World Value Survey shows that France is one of the country which
is closer to the answer “Incomes should be made more equal “ rather than “We
need larger income diﬀerences as incentives“ at the question on income equality.
So, the fact that French people frown upon the superstar eﬀect was expected.
In spite of what the market-driven explanation suggests, the question of
the regulation of CEO compensations is raised due to the public interest for
the question and the numerous European (Netherlands, Switzerland, Germany
and France) policymakers who call for CEO compensation temperance. Indeed,
20Code of Best Practice, made public in France (95 and 99 Vi´ enot reports, 2002
Bouton report) to moderate those compensations, are ineﬃcent and Board of
Adminisatration alone ﬁx the CEO compensation. Nevertheless, some repre-
sentatives of shareholders, call for a mandatory upper limit. How is it possible?
The last section investigates a cap policy and enables us to understand the emer-
gence of protest from shareholders themselves without any equity considerations
or changes in the objective function (maximization of shareholder value rather
than stakholder value).
6 Compensation cap policy
The salary cap terminology derives from the professional sports vocabulary.
More precisely, from team sports like Basketball or Baseball which leagues use
cap to moderate the team compensation by the introduction of an upper limit
envelope based on league revenues. In this paper, the eﬀect of individual cap is
investigated for the CEO. Until now, only limits on the deductibility of executive
pay, like the OBRA in United-States, have been implemented. This policy
have been assessed by Rose and Wolfram [7]. Their results suggest that the
growth of total pay, for limited ﬁrms, decreases slightly and that the structure
of compensation changes in favor of non salary pay. Evaluate the eﬀect of a
cap policy in a sorting framework makes sens as the main economic issue is:
how attract the best manager? Most of the time incentives are not mentioned
to justify the levels of CEO compensations (in France). An upper limit ¯ w is
implemented, it concerns executives whom ﬁrms size is above the threshold ¯ s
such that:
∀s > ¯ s w(s) = ¯ w
In this case, compensations can no longer play their allocative role and the
positive allocation becomes a random matching for all the ﬁrms above this upper
limit. The equation (17) describes the expected production for a ﬁrm whose size
21Figure 3: Compensation structure: Positive Assortative compensation (black
line) and new equilibrium with the upper limit (red line)





1 − F(ϕ(¯ s))
dF(x) (17)
A new equilibrium stands out. Indeed, each ﬁrm who ﬁx freely the CEO com-
pensation must do a trade-oﬀ between hire his ”positive assortative matching”
CEO at the equilibrium price or try to attract a most talented CEO in average
by oﬀering exactly the compensation cap:
Max Y (ϕ(s),s) − w(s)
| {z }
PAM
Y (tp(s),s) − ¯ w
| {z }
cap
A ﬁrm who posts the upper limit compensation expects to be matched with
a CEO with an expected talent denoted tp which is equal to the average talent
above the rank of the talent allocated with the ﬁrm at the PAM equilibrium.
This expected talent, tp, is higher than the one with positive assortative match-






p − s1−αβ). The existence of ﬁrms which set voluntarily a com-
pensation equals to the wage cap in order to attract a most talented manager
depends on the size of their ﬁrm. If the size is above the following threshold











22This trade-oﬀ implies a wider mismatch than expected. The smallest ﬁrms ob-
tain a best joint production at the expense of the largest. The losses inferred
by the cap are always larger for the largest ﬁrms concerned. Indeed, the CEO
they attract is less talented in average than their CEO with positive assortative
matching. To assess the loss inferred by the cap policy, the average aggregate
eﬀect is calculated for the production (∆Y ), the shareholder value (∆π) and
the average loss for CEO (∆w). The global loss is given in proportion of the
total market capitalization in the second column of the Table 2. The two last
columns indicate respectively: in the column intitled ”YES”, the percentage of
shareholders who realize positive gain thanks to the setting up of the compen-
sation cap policy, in the ”NO” column, the shareholder who lose. These two
percentages are calculated according to the weight of each ﬁrm (capitalization),
assuming that the biggest ﬁrms have more shareholders. Indeed, the correla-
tion between the market capitalization and the number of shares outstanding
is above 0.8. For suﬃciently high level of wage cap, i.e 6.4 million euro, the
shareholders whose ﬁrms are concerned by the upper limit are a majority to call
for a cap policy (the proportion reported in the ”YES” column of the Table 2).
Under the six million cap there is no ambiguity, whereas above, the majority
depends on the say of the sharholders who are not concerned by the compen-
sation cap (the supplementary percentage). Nevertheless, CEO whom talent
belongs to the [ϕ(scap),ϕ(¯ s)] are better paid than before the cap policy. They
are paid above their marginal productivity. Actually, for a six million cap, the
mean CEO compensation runs down by 7.4%, it represents a decrease about
half million euro in average. This six million cap is equivalent to 250 French
average salary and equivalent to 430 minimum wage (2004). When a six million
cap is implemented, 20% of the sample is concerned which represents 73.3% of
the global capitalisation. This model gives an interpretation of the increasing
proxy ﬁght which took place during the annual meeting of some of the biggest
French ﬁrms. Moreover, the assess of such a compensation cap is done by using a
random matching function instead of a positive assortative matching. However,
it is without taken into account the information held by the investors about
23prospective CEO, and their commitment to enterprise (if they were already on
the market). Those informations may help to have a better matching function
that expected without the signal of the compensation.
¯ w ∆YGlobal ∆Y ∆w ∆π YES NO
(in million euro) (%) (%)* (%)* (%)* (%) (%)
1.68 -0.115 -0.093 -46.8 -0.074 7.6 91.6
2.97 -0.058 -0.03 -29.4 -0.020 13.5 82.7
3.63 -0.04 -0.016 -23.2 -0.009 17.9 75.9
4.5 -0.024 -0.007 -16.4 -0.003 24.6 64.4
5 -0.017 -0.0043 -13.1 -0.0013 29 56.2
6 -0.0077 -0.0013 -7.4 -0.00004 37 36.3
6.4 -0.005 -0.0007 -5.3 0.00008 38.4 27.6
7 -0.0019 -0.0002 -2.3 0.00007 36.2 12.8
7.5 -0.0006 -0.00005 -0.8 0.00003 27 4.4
Note: * in average
Table 2: Evaluation of the losses and shareholder’s votes about the compensa-
tion cap policy
7 Conclusion
The analysis of the French CEO compensations in a competitive framwork is
able to reproduce the main moments of the distribution and to provide inter-
esting counterfactuals for France. Nevertheless, the comparaison of the simu-
lated data with the empirical data shows that French CEO compensations are
less regular than those generated by the diﬀerential rent modelling. Indeed, the
Spearman coeﬃcient is not equal to one and some other machanisms may play a
role in the determination of CEO compensations through more complex match-
ing technology or others market imperfections. As a conclusion, French CEO
compensations could not be understood as the simple result of a competitive
process of matching, even if those models are the only one able to modelize the
24levels of CEO compensations in a general framework with a very simple design.
This framework allows the French CEO compensations to be linked with the
globalisation process and the oﬀer of talent without the scarcity excuse. The
last section gives an assess of the cost of a compensation cap policy. This cost is
moderate and even, for suﬃciently high caps, attractive for shareholders. The
existence of shareholders lobbies against large amounts of compensation are
explainable on such a sorting model without specifying an other objective func-
tion which would take into account the opinon of stakeholders. Such a policy is
costly and could hardly be implemented with the approval of the shareholders,
it depends of the composition of the shareholding of companies.
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